CARONTE: Detecting Location Leaks for Deanonymizing Tor Hidden Services



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Web Site: http://facebook.com/



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Web Site: http://facebook.com/



- Web Site: http://facebook.com/
- Hidden Service : http://facebookcorewwwi.onion/



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Hidden Services



Hidden Services



Hidden Services



Related Work



Øverlier and Syverson (IEEE S&P 2006) Biryukov et al. (IEEE S&P 2013)



Murdoch (CCS 2006) Zander and Murdoch (USENIX Security 2008)

12P

Crenshaw (BlackHat DC 2011)

Related Work







Murdoch (CCS 2006) Zander and Murdoch (USENIX Security 2008)

I2P

Crenshaw (BlackHat DC 2011)

Related Work











Location Leaks





Location Leaks



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Location Leaks





6 of 23

myd4xi.onion



1. myd4xi.onion is a HS

myd4xi.onion



Host: myd4xi.onion

- 1. myd4xi.onion is a HS
- 2. Request a resource



Host: myd4xi.onion

- 1. myd4xi.onion is a HS
- 2. Request a resource
- 3. HTML contains email address



- 1. myd4xi.onion is a HS
- 2. Request a resource
- 3. HTML contains email address
- 4. Contact mydom.com

Host: mydom.com Host: myd4xi.onion



- 1. myd4xi.onion is a HS
- 2. Request a resource
- 3. HTML contains email address
- 4. Contact mydom.com
- 5. Contact **mydom.com** using the HS as "Host" header

1. Candidate Selection

- a) interaction with the Hidden Service
- b) extraction of candidate endpoints



1. Candidate Selection

- a) interaction with the Hidden Service
- b) extraction of candidate endpoints



2. Validating Candidates

- a) interaction with each candidate
- b) validation of the responses



Contributions



- 1. Novel approach for deanonymizing HS
 - Iocation leaks
 - open-world model





3. First measurement study of prevalence of location leaks within HS



Tor Exploration

1. Input onion URLs

- □ No central repository of all hidden services
- Sources:
 - hidden services listings
 - hidden services search engines
 - Internet search engines
 - blogs, pastebin applications, forums...
- □ Coverage:
 - ≈15K onion URLs collected
 - ≈6K unique onion domains
- 2. Visit onion URLs and collect data.







```
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html lang="en" id="facebook" class="no js">
 <head>
  <meta charset="utf-8">
  <title id="pageTitle">Facebook</title>
  k type="text/css" rel="stylesheet"
     href="https://fbstatic-a.akamaihd.net/rsrc.php/v2/yU/r/Z8FgpY Its6.css" />
 </head>
 <body>
  ...
  <footer>
  <div class="topcontainer">
   Donations:<a href="bitcoin:1BitmixerEivvp3eTLaCpgBbhYERs48gza">
      1BitmixerEivvp3eTLaCpgBbhYERs48gza</a>
   </div>
   </footer>
 </body>
 <!-- Phone: +34-11-222-333 -->
 <!-- Fax: +34-12-121-1212 -->
 <!-- Email: mark@zuckerberg.com -->
</html>
```

```
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html lang="en" id="facebook" class="no js">
 <head>
  <meta charset="utf-8">
  <title id="pageTitle">Facebook</title>
  k type="text/css" rol="styleshoet"
     href="https://fbstatic-a.akamaihd.net/psrc.php/v2/yU/r/Z8FgpY_lts6.css" />
 </head>
                                     1) Domains in URLS
 <body>
  ...
  <footer>
  <div class="topcontainer">
   Donations:<a href="bitcoin:1BitmixerEivvp3eTLaCpgBbhYERs48gza">
      1BitmixerEivvp3eTLaCpgBbhYERs48gza</a>
   </div>
   </footer>
 </body>
 <!-- Phone: +34-11-222-333 -->
                               1) Domains in emails
 <!-- Fax: +34-12-121-1212 -->
 <!-- Email: mark@zuckerberg.com >>
</html>
```



```
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html lang="en" id="facebook" class="no js">
 <head>
                                3) Titles
  <meta charset="utf-8">
  <title id="pageTitle"<Facebook3/title>
  k type="text/css" rel="stylesheet"
     href="https://fbstatic-a.akamaihd.net/psrc.php/v2/yU/r/Z8FgpY_lts6.css" />
 </head>
                                       1) Domains in URLS
 <body>
  ...
  <footer>
  <div class="topcontainer">

     Donations:<a href="bitcoin:1BitmixerEiyyp3eTLaCpgBbhYERs48gza">
      1BitmixerEivvp3eTLaCpgBpnreks4ouzas/gz
                                               2) Identifiers
   </div>
   </footer>
 </body>
                                                         Google Analytics
 <!-- Phone: +34-11-222-333 -->
                                                         Google AdSense
                                1) Domains in emails
 <!-- Fax: +34-12-121-1212 -->
 <!-- Email: mark@zuckerberg.com >>
</html>
```



Candidate Selection: Certificates



- 68 Internet-wide HTTPS scans
- Oct '13 Feb '15
- 205 GB with 35M certificates

Leaf certificates used for:

IPs/domains in Subject CN



- Search leaf Certificate
- Search public key



Search for onion address

Sonar: https://scans.io/study/sonar.ssl



<facebookcorewwwi.onion , google.com> <facebookcorewwwi.onion , facebook.com>



facebookcorewwwi.onion != google.com facebookcorewwwi.onion == facebook.com

Validation Algorithm

Given <candidate,onion>:

- 1. Connect to the candidate
- 2. Fetch resources from the candidate
- 3. Compare "exploration" and "validation" content



Determining Leak Intention

Are the service owners aware of the content leaks?



Determining Leak Intention

Are the service owners aware of the content leaks?



Leak intentional if:

- Onion address \approx Internet candidate
- Internet site contains onion address
- \blacksquare Onion page title \approx Internet domain

	Candidates		Deanonymizations	
Method	Pairs	Onions	All	Unintentional
Endpoints	4,704	793	67	32 (48%)
Identifiers	192	66	12	2 (16%)
Titles	200	157	44	20 (45%)
Certificates	366	63	30	18 (60%)
TOTAL	5,462	841	101	51

- 1,974 live onion addresses (31%)
- 101 Hidden Services deanonymized (5%)
 - □ 50% unintentional leaks
- **21%** deanonymized on Tor relays

Defenses



- Use a dedicated Web server
- Bind the Web server to localhost
 - Tor requests answered; Internet forbidden
 - use a firewall
- Site auditing
- Avoid reuse of certs. and public keys
- Avoid Tor relays

Tor Project already recommends some of these:

https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-hidden-service.html.en

Ethical Considerations

Experiments on live Tor network

- no network degradation
- 1 no malicious relays
- 👤 no access to users traffic



- Approved by ethical board
- downloaded only to HTML pages (i.e., no images or videos)
- No data release
- Reported to Tor Project at submission

Conclusions



1. Novel approach for deanonymizing HS

- Iocation leaks
- open-world model





- 3. First measurement study of prevalence of location leaks
 - □ 5% services deanonymized
 - $\hfill\square$ 21% deanonymized on Tor relays



Caronte: Potential Users





In Greek mythology, Charon or Kharon is the ferryman of Hades who carries souls of the newly deceased across the rivers Styx and Acheron that divided the world of the living from the world of the dead.